As we head into the 2026 midterms, many experts predict that Democrats will retake the House in November, and that the Senate is now competitive as well. Part of Democrats’ success will hinge on their ability to drive up support among women voters.
In 2018, during Trump’s first term, women backed Democratic House candidates by the largest margin recorded in modern history—59% to 40%—helping Democrats retake the House in commanding fashion. In the 2022 midterm cycle, however, just 51% of women backed House Democrats, as voters expressed frustration with the economy, the lingering effects of the pandemic, and Joe Biden’s performance.
Women voters are far from a politically monolithic group. Women of color, particularly African American women, remain the staunchest supporters of Democratic candidates. White women have tended to vote Republican at the presidential and congressional level in recent years—though a slight majority did cast their ballots for House Democrats in the 2018 midterm wave election.
In both of those elections, however, women consistently favored Democratic candidates at significantly higher rates than men. This gender gap—in which U.S. women have been consistently less likely than men to vote for Republican candidates—dates to the 1980 presidential election. Democrats’ ability to widen the gender gap among white women could spell the difference between a good night, in which they retake the House, and a great night, in which they retake the Senate as well.
The type of white women voters most up for grabs, however, will be linked to religion. White Christian voters remain the most steadfast voting bloc for Republican candidates, particularly white evangelical Protestants. PRRI’s Census of American Religion, for instance, finds that nearly seven in ten Republicans are white and Christian, compared with about one in four Democrats. In 2024, majorities of white evangelicals (85%), white Catholics (59%), and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (57%) backed Donald Trump.
This Spotlight Analysis, relying on time-series data from the American National Election Study, Cooperative Election Survey, and PRRI data, examines Republican voting patterns of the three largest subgroups of white Christians by gender. [1] Gender differences emerge even within this staunchly Republican group—though those differences are nuanced, varying depending on which group of white Christians is considered. Examining trend data on the gender gap in voting among white Christians may reveal which groups of white Christian women are more likely to consider voting for Democrats come November.
The Gender Gap in Presidential and Midterm Elections
Men have favored Republican presidential candidates in most elections since Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, though similar shares of men and women voted for George H.W. Bush in 1992, an election in which independent candidate Ross Perot drew support from roughly one in five American voters. In the 2000 election, 53% of men voted Republican, compared with 44% of women—a 9-point gap. This gap narrowed over the next several elections, from 7 points in 2004 (54% vs. 47%) to 5 points in both 2008 (48% vs. 43%) and 2012 (49% vs. 44%). In 2016, when Donald Trump was first elected president, 50% of men voted Republican, compared with 44% of women. The Republican gender gap held roughly steady in both 2020 (49% vs. 42%) and 2024 (53% vs. 47%).
Similar gender gap patterns emerge in recent midterm elections. Congressional elections from 2010 through 2014 saw the gender gap in Republican voting reach double digits. In 2012, for example, 57% of men voted for House Republican candidates, compared with 43% of women. While a majority of women continued to back House Democrats from 2016 through 2024, the gender gap narrowed somewhat by 2024, when 42% of women voted Republican, compared with 49% of men.
The Gender Gap Among White Christian Voters
The gender gap also extends to white Christian voters. Importantly, white Christian women still favor Republican candidates, at both the presidential and congressional level, at much higher rates than women voters overall. Yet white Christian men have been more likely than white Christian women to favor Republican candidates in every election since Reagan’s in 1980 (with the exception of the 1992 race), with the gap hovering between 5 and 12 percentage points. 1996 saw the widest gender gap among white Christian voters, at 12 points, and the gap has since fluctuated between 3 and 8 points. In the most recent presidential election, in 2024, more than seven in ten white Christian men (72%) and two-thirds of white Christian women (66%) voted for Donald Trump.
We see similar ebbs and flows with respect to the gender gap among white Christians in congressional elections, particularly since 2010, ranging from 7 to 11 points. In two cases, white Christian women were 11 points less likely than men to vote for GOP House candidates—in 2012, the year Barack Obama was re-elected president, and in 2018, the Democratic wave election in which House Democrats gained 41 seats.
Gender Divides Are More Pronounced Among White Catholics and White Mainline/Non-Evangelical Protestants Than White Evangelical Protestants
Gender differences are also evident within white Christian subgroups, although they are much larger among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants and white Catholics than among white evangelical Protestants in recent elections.
Among white evangelical Protestants, men have generally been somewhat more likely than women to vote Republican for President. In 2000, 73% of white evangelical Protestant men voted Republican, compared with 68% of women. The gap widened in 2008 (81% vs. 73%), before narrowing in 2012 (79% vs. 78%) and disappearing in 2016 (both 82%). The gender gap re-emerged in 2020 (84% vs. 79%), then shrunk somewhat in 2024 (86% vs. 83%).
The gender gap among white evangelicals in midterm elections since 2010 has been relatively small, hovering at 6 percentage points or below. In 2014, it slightly reversed, as 81% of white evangelical women voted for House Republicans, compared with 79% of men. Yet, overall, very strong majorities of both white evangelical men and women have backed GOP candidates during this time period.
In contrast, gender differences are more pronounced among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants. In 2000, 55% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestant men voted for Republican George W. Bush, compared with 48% of women. The gender gap was smaller in 2012 (61% vs. 57%), then grew somewhat in 2016 (59% vs. 51%) and held roughly steady in 2020 (59% vs. 52%). By 2024, nearly two-thirds of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestant men (63%) voted for Donald Trump, compared with 55% of women—an 8-point difference.
Notably, the gender gap in congressional voting is much larger among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants than other groups and has remained so since 2010. While solid majorities of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestant men have voted Republican since that time, their female counterparts have been more of a swing constituency, and in a few years recently, a majority have voted for Democratic House candidates.
Gender differences among white Catholics have also fluctuated over time with respect to presidential voting, but since 1996, white Catholic men have consistently been more likely than women to vote Republican. This gap has been particularly pronounced in recent elections, with 63% of white Catholic men and 52% of white Catholic women voting for Donald Trump in 2020, compared with 66% and 57%, respectively, in 2024.
Turning to congressional voting, though generally not as wide as the gender gaps among mainline voters, the gap between white Catholic women and white Catholic men has still been notable, with women consistently less likely to vote for GOP House candidates. Unlike white mainline women, however, white Catholic women trend more Republican in their voting, although in 2012 and 2020, a near majority did vote Democratic in House races. In no case since 2010 have more than 37% of white Catholic men voted Democratic in House races.
Takeaways on the Republican Gender Gap Among White Christians
These trends show how white evangelical Protestants have emerged as a highly reliable Republican constituency, with only small gender differences in recent elections. By contrast, white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants and white Catholics remain considerably less Republican than their evangelical counterparts, and gender differences within this group are more pronounced. While these groups have grown more likely to vote Republican since Trump’s first election, women voters in these subgroups of white Christians may be more open to voting for Democratic congressional candidates this election cycle than white Christian men.
[1] To examine religious affiliation over time, we standardized the ANES time series and Cooperative Election Survey religion measures across survey years. Because the wording, response categories, and coding of religious affiliation differ across election years, we recoded the available religion variables into a shared set of categories that could be applied consistently across the full-time series. We use the standardized ANES data for the historical analysis and PRRI survey data to report results for the two most recent presidential elections, 2020 and 2024.

