DARKENING MOOD AND SHIFTING POLITICAL LOYALTIES AHEAD OF MIDTERM ELECTIONS

FINDINGS FROM THE 2026 AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY

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PRRI Team:

- Melissa Deckman, Ph.D., CEO
- Robert P. Jones, Ph.D., President and Founder
- Diana Orcés, Ph.D., Director of Research
- Madelyn Snodgrass, Research Associate
- Sophia Porcaro, Research Intern

- Daniel Hoagland, Director of Operations and Budgeting
- Colleen Ross, Director of Communications
- Avery Park, Communications Assistant
- Tim Duffy, Graphic Design

We would also like to thank **West End Strategy** for providing communications outreach.

PRRI
1400 16th Street NW, Suite 525
Washington, DC 20036
www.prri.org
For more information, contact info@prri.org

Cover images: David Geitgey Sierralupe/Flickr, Stitched Photography/iStock, Slobo/iStock, Edoardo_ceriani/Unsplash, and U.S. Government works.

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Executive Summary

Americans have grown more pessimistic about the country's direction.

- Over seven in ten Americans say the country (71%) and the economy (76%) are headed in the wrong direction, up from 62% and 65%, respectively, in 2025.
- Republicans have grown far more pessimistic, with 43% now saying the country is on the wrong track, up from 24% last year, and 52% saying the economy is going in the wrong direction, a dramatic shift from 29% last year.
- A majority of Americans agree "President Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy" (58%), up slightly from 56% in September 2025, compared with 37% who agree "President Trump is a strong leader who should be given the power he needs to restore America's greatness."
- Most Democrats (90%) agree that Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator and most Republicans agree that Trump is a strong leader (77%). The proportion of independents who agree that Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator is 64%."

Heading into the midterms, Democrats hold a clear enthusiasm advantage, and opposition to President Donald Trump is a far stronger motivator than support for him.

- Democratic voters are significantly more likely than Republican voters to say they are very excited about voting in November (46% vs. 31%).
- Two-thirds of Democrats (68%) say opposing Trump's agenda is a critical issue, while just 32% of Republicans say the same about supporting it. Independents are more than twice as likely to say opposing Trump's agenda is critical (38%) as supporting it (17%).

The coalition that powered Trump's 2024 victory is weakening, as voters of color and younger voters favor Democratic congressional candidates.

- The notable gains Trump made in 2024 among groups that have historically backed Democrats do not appear to reflect a lasting realignment. Among registered voters who plan to vote in the midterms, Black voters favor the Democratic congressional candidate by a wide margin (69% vs. 8%), as do Hispanic voters (48% vs. 26%).
- Young male voters also favor Democrats. Young men ages 18–29 favor the Democratic candidate by 10 points (42% vs. 32%), and young women by 27 points (53% vs. 26%).
- White voters still lean Republican (44% vs. 36%), driven by white voters without a college degree (49% vs. 27%). White college graduates favor the Democratic candidate (47% vs. 37%).

Hispanic Americans have soured sharply on Trump, with the steepest declines among Hispanic Protestants.

- Hispanic Trump voters are twice as likely as white Trump voters to regret their vote (22% vs. 11%).
- Trump favorability among Hispanic Protestants, a majority of whom backed Trump in 2024, has dropped 20 percentage points. Just 31% now view Trump favorably, down from 51% in 2024. Only one in four (25%) view the MAGA movement favorably, down from 45% in 2024.
- Three quarters (76%) of Hispanic Catholics, already largely critical of Trump, disapprove of Trump's overall job performance.

Trump is losing ground with Americans overall, especially on the economy, while immigration remains a source of strength among the Republican base.

- Six in ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump's job performance, up from 56% in 2025; strong disapproval outpaces strong approval by more than 3 to 1 (48% vs. 14%). Nearly half or more *strongly* disapprove of his handling of every issue tested, including the war in Iran (52%), the economy (48%), and making life better for everyday Americans (48%).
- Most Americans (68%) say their opinion of Trump has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years, including among several groups that supported him in 2024: Hispanic Protestants (70%), white women (65%), Americans ages 65 and older (65%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (64%), Americans ages 50–64 (64%), white Catholics (61%), white men (61%), white Americans without a college degree (57%).
- Immigration remains a powerful anchor among Trump supporters. More than eight in ten Republicans (81%) and 67% of white evangelical Protestants approve of Trump's handling of immigration, and about half rate immigration as among their top critical issues (52% and 51%, respectively).

Americans see the MAGA movement as more threatening than Democratic Socialists of America, while the term "Christian nationalism" has become more firmly embraced among Republicans and white evangelical Protestants.

- Nearly half of Americans (48%) say the MAGA movement poses a serious threat to the country, compared with 36% who say the same of Democratic Socialists of America. Eight in ten Democrats (82%) see MAGA as a serious threat, while seven in ten Republicans (72%) say the same of DSA.
- Among Americans who have heard of the term, two-thirds of Republicans (65%) and white evangelical Protestants (64%) now hold favorable views of Christian nationalism.

Confidence in elections remains fragile as Americans divide along partisan lines over election integrity and federal intervention.

- Only about half of Americans (52%) have confidence in elections. Most Republicans (82%) say the biggest problem in U.S. elections is ineligible people casting votes, while most Democrats (80%) say it is eligible voters being denied the right to vote.
- More than one-third of Americans (35%) agree that "if there are serious concerns about voter fraud in a local voting location, the president should order federal agents to seize the ballots and take over the vote counting," compared with six in ten Republicans (58%), particularly those who view Trump favorably (65%), and half of white evangelical Protestants (50%).

A large "empathy gap" has opened up between Republicans and white evangelicals vs. other Americans.

- Two-thirds of Americans (68%) say empathy is a foundational moral value that helps build a healthy society, compared with 27% who say it can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided by God's truth. The vast majority of Democrats (84%) and independents (70%) agree that empathy helps build a healthy society, compared with 54% of Republicans.
- Republicans who hold a favorable view of Trump are split in their views on empathy. About half side with the statement that empathy is a foundational moral value (49%), and nearly as many believe empathy can be dangerous (48%). By contrast, nearly three-quarters of Republicans who view Trump unfavorably (72%) view empathy as a foundational moral value.
- White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group in which a majority does not agree that empathy is foundational moral value (42%). Instead, a majority (54%) say empathy can be dangerous. Views that empathy is dangerous are positively correlated with holding Christian nationalist views.

Six in ten Americans support a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, but Republicans and white evangelical Protestants have moved sharply toward deportation over the past decade, and a majority now back internment camps.

- Six in ten Americans (59%) say undocumented immigrants should be given a way to become citizens, provided they meet certain requirements, a view that has held steady since 2013. However, support has declined among Republicans (53% to 37%) and white evangelical Protestants (56% to 44%), while support for deportations has risen among both groups (32% to 50% and 30% to 47%, respectively).
- At the same time, majorities of Republicans and white evangelical Protestants support detaining undocumented immigrants in internment camps (62% and 53%).

While nearly all Americans oppose repealing the 19th Amendment, the partisan divide over gender roles has more than doubled, and a large gender gap has opened among young Americans.

- Republicans (65%) are nearly four times as likely as Democrats (17%) to agree that society has become too soft and feminine. The partisan gap has grown from 23 points in 2011 to 48 points today.
- Young men ages 18–29 are far more likely than young women to agree that society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for (43% vs. 25%), an 18-point gap roughly double that of any older age group.
- The vast majority of Americans (87%) oppose repealing the 19th Amendment guaranteeing women's right to vote, with overwhelming opposition across every partisan and religious group.

Americans' sympathies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are now nearly at parity, and most prefer the U.S. be known as a reliable neighbor rather than a mighty nation.

- Americans are now about as likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians (19%, up from 15% in 2024) as with Israel (22%, down from 28% in 2024), with younger Americans 18-29 (27%) more likely than Americans ages 50 and older to sympathize with the Palestinians.
- Most Americans (64%) prefer the U.S. to be known as a reliable neighbor that uses military force only as a last resort. Republicans are the exception: 57% prefer a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use force, and white evangelical Protestants are evenly divided (49% vs. 48%).

Most Americans trust their neighbors and people of different backgrounds, but young Americans are the least trusting.

- Majorities of Americans say they trust people in their neighborhood (77%), people of another religion (74%), people born outside the United States (72%), and people who support another political party (61%). Americans are split on trusting people they meet for the first time (48% trust vs. 46% do not). Young Americans ages 18–29 are the least trusting age group.

Introduction

With the 2026 midterm elections approaching, the 17th annual American Values Survey of more than 5,000 Americans, conducted by PRRI in partnership with the Brookings Institution, takes a closer look at Americans' attitudes toward President Donald Trump and his administration, as well as the issues shaping voters' preferences and enthusiasm heading into the midterms. The survey also illuminates Americans' concerns about the direction of the country, the state of the economy, and the federal government's ability to meet the needs of everyday Americans. Additionally, the survey highlights Americans' views on the health of democracy and elections, immigration, economic inequality and socialism, the MAGA movement and Christian nationalism, empathy and gender roles, foreign policy, and trust in people from different backgrounds.

The State of the Country

The Right or Wrong Direction?

The Country

Most Americans say things in the country are going in the wrong direction (71%), compared with 27% who say the country is going in the right direction. Views about the direction of the country are more pessimistic than in 2025, when 62% of Americans said the country is headed in the wrong direction. This year, most Democrats say the country is going in the wrong direction (93%),

FIGURE 1. Republican Perception of the Direction of the Country, in Years When Trump Is President

Percent who say the country is going in the wrong direction:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2018-2026.

compared with 43% of Republicans. However, Republicans have grown significantly more likely to say that the country is going in the wrong direction, up from 24% in 2025, as have independents, from 71% in 2025 to 77% today.

Economy

About three in four Americans say the economy is going in the wrong direction (76%), while 22% say that the economy is going in the right direction. This outlook is more pessimistic than last year (65% wrong, 33% right). Overwhelming numbers of Democrats (93%) and independents (81%, up from 74% in 2025) say the economy is going in the wrong direction. Republican dissatisfaction with the economy has gone up 23 percentage points over the last year, from 29% to a majority (52%) today.

Foreign Affairs

Seven in ten Americans say the way the U.S. is dealing with other countries is going in the wrong direction (70%, up from 60% in 2025), while 27% say it is going in the right direction. While Republicans (60%) are much more likely to support U.S. foreign policy than independents (21%) and Democrats (6%), support has declined across all partisans since last year, down from 77% among Republicans, 30% among independents, and 10% among Democrats.

Federal Government's Handling of Undocumented Immigrants

Most Americans say the way the federal government is handling undocumented immigrants is going in the wrong direction (62%, up from 57% in 2025), compared with over one-third who say it is going in the right direction (36%, down from 41% in 2025). More than two-thirds of Democrats (92%) and independents (68%) say the way the federal government is handling undocumented immigrants is going in the wrong direction, compared with 21% of Republicans. Most Republicans say it is going in the right direction (78%).

FIGURE 2. Shifts in Perceptions of the Direction of the Country, 2025 and 2026, by Party

Percent who say ___ is headed in the wrong direction:



Source: PRRI American Values Surveys, 2025 and 2026.

Things in My Local Community

Americans are more upbeat about the direction of their local communities, with 51% saying things are going in the right direction and 46% saying they are going in the wrong direction. Democrats (48% right, 51% wrong) and independents (50% right, 47% wrong) are similarly divided, while Republicans are significantly more likely to say the things in their local community are going in the right direction (65%) than in the wrong direction (34%).

Changes for the Worse or the Better, Over the Last Two Years

Nearly three-quarters of Americans say that the ability of the federal government to meet the needs of everyday Americans has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years (73%), while 23% say it has mostly changed for the better. This view has become more pessimistic since 2025 (66% worse, 30% in better). Most Democrats (93%) and independents (78%) say it has mostly changed for the worse, compared with Republicans, who are more divided (47% worse, 49% better). Republicans have become 13 percentage points more likely to say it changed for the worse since 2025, up from 34%.

Most Americans say that America's standing and reputation in the world has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years (71%), while one-quarter say it has mostly changed for the better (25%). This view has become more pessimistic since 2025 (63% worse, 34% in better). Most Democrats (93%) and independents (78%, up from 74% in 2025) say it has mostly changed for the worse, compared with 43% of Republicans. Republicans have become 16 percentage points more likely to say that America's standing and reputation in the world has mostly changed for the worse since last year, up from 27%.

A slim majority of Americans say their own economic situation has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years (56%), while 39% say it has mostly changed for the better. This view has

FIGURE 3. Shifts in Perceptions of the State of the Country, 2025 and 2026, by Party

Percent who say ___ has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years:



Source: PRRI American Values Surveys, 2025 and 2026.

become more pessimistic since 2025 (52% worse, 43% in better). A majority of Democrats (72%) and independents (58%) say their economic situation mostly changed for the worse, compared with 35% of Republicans. This pessimistic view has gone up from 66% among Democrats and 31% among Republicans since 2025.

Most Americans say that their opinion of Trump has mostly changed for the worse (68%) over the last two years, while just 27% say it has mostly changed for the better. Most Democrats (94%) and independents (74%) say it has mostly changed for the worse. Notably, more than one-third

FIGURE 4. Changing Views of Trump Over the Last Two Years, Among 2024 Trump Supporters, by Party, Religion, and Key Demographics

Percent who say their opinion of Donald Trump has mostly changed for ____ over the last two years:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

of Republicans (35%) say their view of Trump has mostly changed for the worse. Over six in ten Republicans (61%), however, say it has mostly changed for the better.

In the religious landscape, even groups that have historically supported Trump now report significant numbers saying their opinion of him has changed for the worse over the last two years: white evangelical Protestants (44% worse, 50% better), Latter-day Saints (50% worse, 48% better), white Catholics (61% worse), and white non-evangelical Protestants (64% worse). Most notable among Trump supporting groups are Hispanic Protestants, among whom 70% say their opinion of Trump has changed for the worse.[1]

1 We identified the groups in which a majority of voters reported voting for Trump based on PRRI's 2024 Post-Election Survey. In addition, to measure Christian nationalism, PRRI used a battery of five questions based on respondents' answers to (1) The U.S. government should declare America a Christian nation, (2) U.S. laws should be based on Christian values, (3) If the U.S. moves away from our Christian foundations, we will not have a country anymore, (4) Being Christian is an important part of being truly American, and (5) God has called Christians to exercise dominion over all areas of American society. Each respondent receives a composite score on the Christian nationalism scale (with a range of 0 to 1) and is then assigned to one of the four groups. For more information about how measures are constructed and Christian nationalism more generally, please see our previous reports: "A Christian Nation? Understanding the Threat of Christian Nationalism to American Democracy and Culture," "Support for Christian Nationalism in All 50 States: Findings from PRRI's 2023 American Values Atlas," "Christian Nationalism Across All 50 States: Insights from PRRI's 2024 American Values Atlas.," and "Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI's 2025 American Values Atlas."

Perceptions of Political Groups and Their Influence on the Country

Americans were asked to evaluate whether the policies of each party and movement move the country in the right direction, are misguided but not dangerous, or pose a serious threat to the country.

The Republican Party and the Democratic Party

Americans remain more likely to view the Republican Party (36%), rather than the Democratic Party (28%), as a serious threat to the country. While views of the Republican Party as a threat have held steady since Trump's re-election in 2024, views of the Democratic Party as a threat have declined, from 32% to 28%.

Majorities of partisans unsurprisingly see the other party as a serious threat to the country. Independents are significantly more likely to say the Republican Party poses a serious threat (36%) than the Democratic Party (25%), consistent with their views in 2024 (35% vs. 27%).

FIGURE 5. Political Parties Viewed as Threats, by Party

Percent who say that the ___ poses a serious threat to the country:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

The MAGA Movement and Democratic Socialists of America

Americans are more likely to view the MAGA movement as posing a serious threat (48%) than the Democratic Socialists of America (36%). These views vary sharply by party. Most Democrats view the MAGA movement as a serious threat (82%), while most Republicans say the same about DSA (72%). Independents are more divided, with 51% viewing the MAGA movement as a serious threat, compared with 35% who say the same about DSA.

Half of Americans ages 18-29 and 30-49 (50% each) and 48% of Americans 65 and older say the MAGA movement's policies pose a serious threat to the country, compared with 42% of Americans ages 50-64. Views that the DSA's policies pose a serious threat to the country increase by age: 27% of Americans ages 18-29, 30% of those ages 30-49, 41% of those ages 50-64, and 45% of those ages 65 and over.

FIGURE 6. Views of Political Movements as a Threat to the Country, by Party

Percent who say the ___ poses a serious threat:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Critical Issues

Among 11 political issues, Americans are the most likely to rate increasing costs of housing and everyday expenses (61%), electing leaders of good moral character (59%), and healthcare (53%) as critical. Roughly four in ten Americans say the war in Iran (45%), immigration (40%), jobs and unemployment (40%), opposing Trump's agenda (39%), and crime (38%) are critical issues. One-third say artificial intelligence, or AI, is a critical issue (34%, up from 19% in 2023), while 30% say reforming the U.S. Supreme Court and 23% say supporting Trump's agenda are critical issues.

By Party Affiliation

Majorities of Republicans (51% and 53%), independents (62% and 60%), and Democrats (69% and 68%) consider the increasing cost of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character to be critical issues. Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are less likely than those who hold unfavorable views to say that electing leaders of good moral character is a critical issue (51% vs 62%). Majorities of Democrats also rate healthcare (67%) and the war in Iran (58%) as critical issues, compared with smaller shares of Republicans (39% and 39%, respectively). By contrast, a majority of Republicans rate immigration (52%) as a critical issue, compared with 37% of Democrats. Majorities of neither party rank jobs and unemployment, crime, artificial intelligence, or reforming the U.S. Supreme Court as critical issues.

FIGURE 7. Top Critical Issues, by Party

Percent who think the following are critical issues:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Views of Trump's agenda itself are sharply polarized. A majority of Democrats (68%) consider opposing Trump's agenda a critical issue, compared with 38% of independents and just 13% of Republicans. Supporting Trump's agenda draws far less consensus across the board: Just 32% of Republicans rank it as a critical issue, compared with few independents (17%) and Democrats (22%).

The salience of immigration as a key issue dominating political discussions has shifted significantly over the last two years among Democrats, Republicans, and independents. While Republicans have become less likely to say immigration is a critical issue (71% in 2024 to 52% this year), Democrats have become more likely to do so (24% in 2024 to 37% this year).

By Religion

Majorities across religious groups say rising costs of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character are critical issues, but elsewhere their priorities diverge. While majorities of non-Christian religious adherents (62%), religiously unaffiliated (58%), and Christians of color (56%) rate healthcare as a critical issue, fewer white Christians do (46%). Majorities of Christians of color also cite the war in Iran (53%) and jobs and unemployment (51%) as critical issues. While half of non-Christian religious adherents (50%) rate jobs and unemployment as a critical issue, half of religiously unaffiliated Americans rate opposing Trump's agenda as critical (50%). By contrast, increasing costs of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character are the only issues that majorities of white Christians rate as critical.

By Race

While majorities across racial groups say rising costs of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character are critical issues, and at least half say the same about healthcare, priorities on other issues diverge. Black Americans most often cite jobs and unemployment (58%), the war in Iran (53%), and opposing Trump's agenda (53%) as critical issues. Hispanic Americans highlight the war in Iran (50%) and jobs and unemployment (49%) as critical issues. AAPI Americans also prioritize jobs and unemployment (50%), while 49% of white Americans list healthcare. By contrast, majorities of multiracial and white Americans are less likely to prioritize any other political issue.

The State of the Economy in America

Concerns Over the Economy

Concerns Over Living Expenses

Nearly four in ten Americans (39%) agree with the statement "I am very concerned that my family will not be able to pay for housing and basic living expenses over the next year," while 57% disagree. Democrats (47%) and independents (41%) are more likely than Republicans (27%) to be very concerned over their family's expenses over the next year. Since last year, economic concerns have increased among Democrats (up from 42%) and independents (up from 38%), and declined slightly among Republicans (down from 30%).

Nearly six in ten Hispanic Americans (58%) say they are very concerned that their family will not be able to pay for housing and basic living expenses over the next year, followed by 52% of Black Americans and 47% of multiracial Americans. AAPI (36%) and white (31%) Americans, Americans without a college degree (47%), and women (43%) are more likely than those with a college degree (26%) and men (36%) to be concerned over their family's expenses. These views have not shifted much since last year.

Economic concerns decrease by age: 44% of Americans ages 18-29, 42% of those ages 30-49, 37% of those ages 50-64, and 35% of those ages 65 and over.

Impossible Today for Working Families to Make Ends Meet

About seven in ten Americans (71%) agree that "it's nearly impossible today for working families to make ends meet," while 26% disagree. Majorities of Democrats (85%) and independents (73%), and 52% of Republicans agree.

Solid majorities across all racial groups agree that it is nearly impossible today for working families to make ends meet. However, white Americans (66%) are less likely to hold this view than Americans of color, including 81% of Black Americans, 78% of Hispanic Americans, 77% of multiracial Americans, and 72% of AAPI Americans. While majorities across age groups, gender, and education levels hold this view, women (75%) are significantly more likely than men (65%) to do so.

The Economy is Rigged Against Working Americans

Nearly seven in ten Americans (69%) agree that "the economy is rigged against working Americans to benefit the rich and powerful," while 28% disagree. Majorities of Democrats (88%) and independents (74%) hold this view, compared with 44% of Republicans.

FIGURE 8. Views on the Economy, by Party

Percent who agree:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Solid majorities across all racial groups agree that the economy is rigged against working Americans to benefit the rich and powerful. However, white Americans (63%) are less likely to hold this view than Americans of color, including 82% of Black Americans, 76% of AAPI Americans, 73% of Hispanic Americans, and 70% of multiracial Americans. Women (72%) are significantly more likely than men (65%) to hold this view, as are Americans ages 30-49 (74%), compared with young Americans ages 18-29 (69%) and older Americans over 50 (65%).

Rapid Expansion of AI Benefits Corporations but Hurts American Workers

Over seven in ten Americans (72%) agree that the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence, or AI, will benefit big corporations but hurt American workers, compared with one-quarter of Americans (25%) who disagree. Though majorities of each partisan group agree with this view of AI, Democrats (82%) are more likely than independents (73%) and Republicans (62%) to agree AI will benefit corporations while hurting American workers.

Three in four women (74%) agree the rapid expansion of AI will benefit big corporations but hurt American workers, compared with less than seven in ten men (68%); gender is the only demographic with significant differences.

Economic Policies

Support for Cutting Taxes for Everyone

Two-thirds of Americans favor cutting taxes for everyone to speed up economic growth and job creation (65%), compared with 29% who oppose. While majorities of all partisans agree, Republicans (79%) and independents (64%) are more likely to do so than Democrats (57%).

Support for cutting taxes for everyone is high across all religious groups, from about seven in ten among Hispanic Catholics, white evangelical Protestants, Black Protestants, Hispanic Protestants, and white Catholics (ranging from 70-77%) to a still-majority 54% among the religiously unaffiliated, who are the least likely to agree, along with Jewish Americans (55%).

Support for Raising Taxes on Wealthy People and Corporations

Two-thirds of Americans favor raising taxes on wealthy people and corporations so government can help people who are struggling to make ends meet (66%), compared with 30% who oppose. Democrats (89%) and independents (69%) are significantly more likely than Republicans (40%) to favor this policy.

FIGURE 9. Views on Taxes, Economic Growth, and Government Assistance, by Party

Percent who favor:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Support for raising taxes on the wealthy is strongest among Black Protestants (81%), Hispanic Catholics (80%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (79%), as well as 75% of other non-Christians. At least six in ten Hispanic Protestants (67%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (63%), and Jewish Americans (60%) also favor this policy, as do 58% of white Catholics. White evangelical Protestants (47%) and Latter-day Saints (43%) are the only groups without majority support.

Support for a Minimum Income

Six in ten Americans favor guaranteeing all Americans a minimum income (60%, down from 70% in 2020), compared with one-third who oppose (34%, up from 29% in 2020). Most Democrats (80%) and independents (61%) favor this policy, compared with 40% of Republicans (40%). Support has declined across all partisans since 2020 when PRRI first asked this question, from 88% among Democrats, 69% among independents, and 52% among Republicans.

Support for a guaranteed minimum income is highest among Hispanic Catholics (78%), Hispanic Protestants (77%), Black Protestants (74%), other non-Christians (73%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (70%). By contrast, smaller majorities of Jewish Americans (56%), white non-evangelical Protestant (54%), and white Catholics (51%) favor this policy. Just four in ten Latter-day Saints (41%) and white evangelical Protestants (40%) favor guaranteeing all Americans a minimum income.

Support for guaranteeing all Americans a minimum income is significantly higher among younger Americans: 64% each among those ages 18-29 and 30-49 favor this policy, compared with 56% of those ages 50-64 and 57% of those ages 65 and older.

Support for Affordable Health Insurance and Childcare

Two-thirds of Americans favor guaranteeing all Americans access to affordable health insurance and childcare, even if doing so requires raising taxes (66%), compared with 30% who oppose. Most Democrats (86%) and independents (68%) favor this policy, compared with 44% of Republicans.

Roughly three in four Christians of color, non-Christians, and Jewish Americans favor guaranteeing all Americans access to affordable health insurance and childcare, including Black Protestants (79%), other non-Christians (78%), Hispanic Catholics (77%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (77%), Jewish Americans (76%), and Hispanic Protestants (74%). Support drops among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestant (62%) and white Catholics (57%), while white evangelical Protestants (48%) and Latter-day Saints (42%) are the least likely to favor it.

Capitalism vs. Socialism

Socialism as Government Benefits or Government Control of the Economy?

A slim majority of Americans are more likely to agree with the statement (51%) "Socialism is best understood as a system in which the government provides benefits such as health insurance, retirement support, and access to free higher education" than with the statement "Socialism is best understood as a system in which the government controls major parts of the economy, such as utilities, transportation, communications, and banks" (43%).

Partisans hold sharply different conceptions of the term. Nearly three-quarters of Democrats (73%) associate socialism with government-provided benefits, compared with 24% who see it as government control of major industries. Republicans reverse this pattern: Two-thirds define socialism as government control of the economy (66%), while only 31% equate it with a system of social benefits. Independents mirror the public overall, with 51% choosing the benefits definition and 43% choosing the government-control definition.

The majority of other non-Christians (66%), Black Protestants (63%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (62%), Jewish Americans (60%), and Hispanic Catholics (56%) are more likely to view socialism as a system that provides benefits, while the majority of white evangelical Protestants (65%), Latter-day Saints (65%), and Hispanic Protestants (56%) are more likely to view socialism as a system that controls the economy. White mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (50% vs. 48%) and white Catholics (49% vs. 48%) are equally divided on their views of socialism.

FIGURE 10. Socialism as Government Benefits or Government Control of the Economy, by Party
Percent who agree socialism is best understood as:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Support for Adopting Aspects of Socialism

Around four in ten Americans agree that "capitalism is no longer working for average Americans, and the country should consider adopting some aspects of socialism" (41%), compared the majority who oppose (54%) it. Two-thirds of Democrats (66%) agree with this statement, compared with 38% of independents and just 18% of Republicans.

Only non-Christians (60%), Black Protestants (59%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (58%) express majority agreement with adopting aspects of socialism, compared with 48% of Hispanic Protestants, 45% of Hispanic Catholics, and 41% of Jewish Americans. White Christian groups are the least likely to agree that capitalism is no longer working and the country should adopt aspects of socialism, including 32% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, white Catholics (28%), Latter-day Saints (26%), and white evangelical Protestants (18%).

Younger Americans are significantly more likely than older Americans to agree that capitalism is no longer working for average Americans and the country should consider adopting some aspects of socialism: 48% among those ages 18-29 and 47% of those ages 30-49 agree, compared with 35% of those ages 50-64 and 32% of those ages 65 and older.

FIGURE 11. Support for Adopting Aspects of Socialism, by Party

Percent who agree "Capitalism is no longer working for average Americans, and the country should consider adopting some aspects of socialism:"



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Confidence in Institutions

While majorities of Americans report having a great deal or some confidence in the military (70%), the police (63%, slightly down from 67% in 2025), colleges and universities (55%), and elections (52%), fewer Americans say they have a great deal or some confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court (45%, slightly down from 49% in 2025), organized religion (44%), news organizations (35%), and large business corporations (33%). Confidence in the federal government (35% in 2026, 41% in 2025) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (35% in 2026, 42% in 2025) has declined significantly since last year.

Majorities of Republicans have a great deal or some confidence in the military (89%), the police (83%), ICE (74%, down from 79% in 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court (71%, down from 77% in 2025), organized religion (66%), elections (56%), the federal government (55%, down from 65% in 2025), and large business corporations (52%, up from 48% in 2025), while the majority of Democrats have the most confidence in colleges and universities (76%), elections (65%), the military (63%), the police (57%), and news organizations (54%). Democrats are far less likely to have a great deal of confidence in organized religion (36%), the U.S. Supreme Court (29%), the federal government

TABLE 1. Confidence in Institutions, by Party
Percent who have a great deal or some confidence in:

	All Americans	Republican	Independent	Democrat
The military	70	89	70	63
The police	63	83	63	57
Colleges and universities	55	41	57	76
Elections	52	56	50	65
The U.S. Supreme Court	45	71	44	29
Organized religion	44	66	41	36
The federal government	35	55	30	28
News organizations	35	23	35	54
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement known as ICE	35	74	29	11
Large business corporations	33	52	29	24

Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

(28%), large business corporations (24%), and ICE (11%, down from 16% in 2025). By contrast, Republicans are by far less likely to have confidence in colleges and universities (41%) and news organizations (23%).

While independents tend to mirror all Americans, they are less likely to have a great deal or some confidence in large business corporations (29%), ICE (29%, down from 37% in 2025), and the federal government (30%, down from 37% in 2025).

While most white evangelical Protestants and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants had a great deal or some confidence in ICE in 2025, confidence has declined significantly among both groups over the past year. The steepest decline is among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, from 59% to 45%, followed by white evangelical Protestants, from 68% to 61%. Black Protestants (14%, down from 28%) and religiously unaffiliated Americans (18%, down from 23%) are also less likely to have confidence in ICE. Notably, both Hispanic Protestants (29%) and Hispanic Catholics (26%) — groups that have been targeted by ICE — register low levels of confidence.

President Trump's Job Approval, Favorability, and Leadership

Job Approval

As President

A majority of Americans (61%) disapprove of the job Trump is doing as president, compared with one-third who approve (35%). Disapproval of Trump has intensified since last year, when 56% disapproved and 42% approved. Most Republicans (76%) continue to approve of the job Trump is doing as president, compared with just 30% of independents and 6% of Democrats. However, approval has declined 10 points among Republicans, from 86% since last year.

Notably, more than three times as many Americans strongly disapprove than strongly approve of Trump's job performance (48% vs. 14%). On every measure, Trump's strongly disapprove numbers are more than twice as high as his strongly approve numbers.

White evangelical Protestants (66%) and Latter-day Saints (61%) are the only religious groups in which a majority still approves of the job Trump is doing as president. Notably, two-thirds of Hispanic Protestants (66%), a group that supported Trump in 2024, now disapprove of his job performance. All other religious groups are either divided or have majorities who disapprove, including 86% of Black Protestants, 78% of religiously unaffiliated, 76% of Hispanic Catholics, 75% of other non-Christians, and Jewish Americans (65%), and half of white mainline/non-evangelical Protes-

FIGURE 12. Trump's Job Approval

Percent who _____the job Donald Trump is doing:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

tants (52% disapprove vs. 48% approve) and white Catholics (50% disapprove vs. 49% approve). Compared with last year, Trump's approval declined significantly across all religious groups, except for the unaffiliated and other non-Christians, while it went up among Jewish Americans from 29%.

Among Christian nationalism Adherents, 70% approve of the job Trump is doing as president, (down from 77% in 2025), followed by 57% of Sympathizers (down from 67% in 2025), 32% of Skeptics (down from 42% in 2025), and 8% of Rejecters.

FIGURE 13. Decline in Trump Presidential Job Approval, 2025 and 2026, by Religion
Percentage-point change in Trump job approval:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

On the Issues

A majority of Americans disapprove of the job Trump is doing handling the war in Iran (69%), including a majority who strongly disapprove (52%), while 28% approve. Over six in ten Republicans approve of the job Trump is doing handling the war in Iran (62%), compared with two in ten independents (21%), and only one in ten Democrats (5%).

Most Americans disapprove of Trump's handling of the economy (65%, including 48% who strongly disapprove), while 31% approve. Disapproval has grown since last year (58% disapprove vs. 39% approve). Republicans largely approve (68%), compared with 24% of independents and just 6% of Democrats. Approval has dropped sharply among Republicans (from 81%) and independents (from 31%) since last year.

A majority of Americans also disapprove of the job Trump is doing making life better for everyday Americans (63%), including 48% who strongly disapprove, while 33% approve. Republicans are far

FIGURE 14. Trump's Job Approval, 2025 and 2026, by Party

Percent who approve of the job Donald Trump is doing:



Source: PRRI American Values Surveys, 2025 and 2026.

more approving (72%) than independents (27%) or Democrats (6%).

A majority of Americans disapprove of Trump's handling of immigration (59%, including 45% who strongly disapprove), while 38% approve. Disapproval has grown since last year (54% disapprove vs. 43% approve). Most Republicans approve (81%), compared with 33% of independents and 7% of Democrats. Approval decreased since last year, from 86% among Republicans and from 37% among independents. Trump's job approval on immigration has declined significantly over the past year among white evangelical Protestants (74% to 67%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (62% to 52%), and Hispanic Catholics (32% to 19%).[2]

2 Because this question was asked of a half sample in 2025, the sample sizes for Hispanic Protestants, Latter-day Saints, and non-Christians are too low to report.

Favorability Ratings

Donald Trump

Nearly two years into the second Trump administration, 33% of Americans hold favorable views of Trump, down slightly from 34% in May, 36% in February, and 7 percentage points lower than in September 2024 (41%) ahead of the last presidential election. Six in ten Americans view Trump unfavorably (62%).

Nearly eight in ten Republicans (76%, down from 79% in May 2026) continue to hold favorable views of Trump, compared with just one-quarter of independents (28%, up from 25% in May 2026), and 5% of Democrats. However, favorability among Republicans and independents has continued a downward trend since September 2024, when 84% of Republicans and 37% of independents viewed Trump favorably.

When examining Trump's favorability ratings by a 7-point party identification scale between 2024 and 2026, the sharpest decreases occur among independents and Republican-leaning voters.[3] While favorability among "strong Republicans" remains high, it has declined 4 points, from 93% to 89%. Support among less committed Republicans has weakened significantly too, with favorability among "not very strong Republicans" dropping 11 points, from 70% to 59%.

FIGURE 15. Decline in Trump Favorability Between 2024 and 2026, by Party Affiliation and Leaners

Percentage-point change in favorable views of Donald Trump:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2024 and 2026.

3 For this report, we use an updated version of 7-point party identification to capture undecided and independents in the independent category, while excluding those who identify as "other."

"Republican leaners" also show a significant decline, falling 12 points, from 69% to 57%. Significant declines were also evident among true independents (those who do not lean toward either party), who experienced a 20-percentage-point decrease, from 35% to 15%. While Democrat leaners and strong Democrats remained virtually unchanged in their view of Trump over the last two years, "not very strong Democrats" also dropped 7 points, from 12% to 5%.

Among groups who supported Trump in the 2024 election, Trump's favorability remains highest among white evangelical Protestants (62%), the only religious group where the majority holds a favorable view of him. White Catholics and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants are now divided (49% and 46% hold favorable views, respectively). However, all three groups have become less favorable toward Trump since 2024, when 72% of white evangelical Protestants, 53% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, and 51% of white Catholics held favorable views. Only 31% of Hispanic Protestants now hold a favorable view of Trump, down from 51% in 2024.

Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (54%) have a favorable opinion of Trump, compared with 30% of Skeptics and 6% of Rejecters. Favorable views of Trump have gone down significantly since 2024 across all groups (78%, 66%, 41%, and 11%, respectively).

FIGURE 16. Favorability of Trump Over Time, Among Religious Groups Who Supported Trump in 2024

Percent who hold a favorable view of Donald Trump:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2015-2026.

Trump's Leadership

Trump is a Strong Leader or a Potentially Dangerous Dictator?

A majority of Americans are more likely to agree with the statement "President Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy" (58%) than with the statement "President Trump is a strong leader who should be given the power he needs to restore America's greatness" (37%).

The percentage of Americans who see Trump as a potentially dangerous dictator has grown, from 52% in March 2025 to 56% in September 2025 and 59% in May 2026, before reaching 58% today.[4] Most Democrats (90%, up from 87% in March) agree with the first statement and most Republicans agree with the second statement (77%, slightly down from 81% in March). The proportion of independents who agree that Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator has increased by 8 percentage points since March, from 56% to 64%.

FIGURE 17. Views of Trump as a Potentially Dangerous Dictator Rather Than Strong Leader Restoring America's Greatness, 2025 and 2026, by Party

Percent who agree that Trump is potentially a dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2025 and 2026.

4 This question was asked for the first time in March 2025, with slightly different wording, as follows: the statements were worded as: "Statement 1: President Trump is a strong leader who should be given the power he needs to restore America's greatness. OR Statement 2: President Trump is a dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy."

Today, white evangelical Protestants are the only religious group in which a clear majority believe Trump is a strong leader (65%, down from 73%); white Catholics (52%, down from 56%), and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (48%, down from 54%) are more divided. By contrast, 80% of Black Protestants, 75% of unaffiliated Americans, 72% of other non-Christians, 71% of Hispanic Catholics, 64% of Jewish Americans, and 62% of Hispanic Protestants view Trump as a potentially dangerous dictator whose power should be limited.

Most Christian nationalism Rejecters (90%) and Skeptics (64%) agree that Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator, compared with just 39% of Sympathizers and 26% of Adherents. By contrast, most Adherents (72%) and Sympathizers (60%) view Trump as a strong leader who should be given the power to restore America's greatness, compared with 36% of Skeptics and just 10% of Rejecters.

Favorable Views of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) Movement

Three in ten Americans hold favorable views of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement (31%), compared with 61% who hold unfavorable views. Just 4% have not heard of this term. Favorable views of the MAGA movement have decreased from 35% in March 2024, when PRRI first asked this question. Republicans (72%) are significantly more likely than independents (25%) and Democrats (5%) to hold favorable views of the MAGA movement. Republican views have remained stable since March 2024, while independents and Democrats have become less likely to hold favorable views, down from 29% and 9%, respectively.

White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group among whom a majority view the MAGA movement favorably (61%), followed by white Catholics (46%), Latter-day Saints (44%), and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (42%). Notably, only one in four Hispanic Protestants (25%) hold a favorable view of the MAGA movement, down from 45% in 2024. Less than three in ten Jewish Americans (28%), and other non-Christians (26%) hold favorable views of the MAGA movement, as do even fewer unaffiliated Americans (16%), Hispanic Catholics (15%), and Black Protestants (11%).

More than two-thirds of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) hold favorable views of the MAGA movement, followed by 52% of Sympathizers, down from 58% in 2024. By contrast, just 27% of Skeptics — down from 34% in 2024 — and 5% of Rejecters hold favorable views.

Christian Nationalism and Favorable Views

One-third of Americans (33%) qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers, a share that has held relatively stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022 (ranging from 29% to 34%). Nearly six in ten Republicans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (59%), compared with only 26% of independents and 18% of Democrats.

When asked about their perceptions of the term "Christian nationalism" itself, Americans are twice as likely to hold unfavorable (48%) as favorable (24%) views of the term. Favorable views of the term "Christian nationalism" have increased since 2022 from 20%. At the same time, the share of Americans who say they have not heard of the term has dropped from 35% to 24%.

Among Americans who have heard of the term "Christian nationalism," one-third hold a favorable view of the term (32%), compared with 63% who hold an unfavorable view. Two-thirds of Republicans who have heard of Christian nationalism hold a favorable view of the term (65%), compared with 28% of independents and 13% of Democrats. These views have remained stable since 2022.

FIGURE 18. Favorable Views of the Term "Christian Nationalism," 2022 and 2026, by Party
Percent who hold very or somewhat favorable views of the term "Christian nationalism":



Note: Analysis restricted to those who have heard of the term "Christian nationalism."

Source: PRRI Surveys, 2022 and 2026.

Among religious groups who have heard of Christian nationalism, nearly two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants (64%) hold favorable views of the term, followed by around four in ten Hispanic Protestants (43%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (42%), and white Catholics (40%). Around three in ten Black Protestants (32%) and one in four Hispanic Catholics (25%) also view Christian nationalism favorably, as do one in ten members of other non-Christian religions (17%), Jewish Americans (15%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (9%). White Christian groups (white evangelical Protestants, white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, white Catholics) are significantly more likely to hold favorable views of Christian nationalism today than they did in 2022, while Christians of color (Hispanic Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, and Black Protestants) are less likely to do so.

FIGURE 19. Favorable Views of the Term "Christian Nationalism," 2022 and 2026, by Religion
Percent who hold very or somewhat favorable views of the term "Christian nationalism":



Note: Analysis restricted to those who have heard of the term "Christian nationalism."

Source: PRRI Surveys, 2022 and 2026.

Among those who have heard of the term “Christian nationalism,” strong majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (84%) and Sympathizers (64%) hold favorable views of the term, compared with 25% of Skeptics and just 3% of Rejecters. Sympathizers are the only group whose favorable views of Christian nationalism have declined, from 72% in 2022 to 64% today.

FIGURE 20. Favorable Views of the Term “Christian Nationalism,” 2022 and 2026, by Christian Nationalism Groups

Percent who hold very or somewhat favorable views of the term “Christian nationalism”:



Note: Analysis restricted to those who have heard of the term “Christian nationalism.”

Source: PRRI Surveys, 2022 and 2026.

Elections and Political Parties

The 2026 Midterm Election

Vote Excitement Among Registered Voters

At the time of this survey, in early September, 36% of American adults say they plan to vote for the Democratic congressional candidate in their district, 28% say they plan to vote for the Republican candidate, 19% are unsure, 12% say they did not plan to vote, and 4% say they plan to vote for an "other" or third-party candidate. Among registered voters who plan to vote, 43% say they will support the Democrat, 36% support the Republican, 3% support other candidates, and 18% are unsure.

At the time of our last midterm election, our 2022 American Values Survey found that among registered voters, voting intentions were more evenly split, with 38% saying they planned to vote for Democrats for Congress, compared with 37% who said they were planning to vote for Republicans. The percentage of registered voters indicating they were unsure of their vote stood at 24%.

Three-quarters of registered voters who plan on voting in the upcoming midterms report being at least a little excited about voting in November, including 34% who are very excited, 23% who are somewhat excited, and 17% who are a little excited. One in four are not at all excited about voting (26%). Among the registered voters who plan to vote and are at least somewhat excited about

FIGURE 21. The 2026 Congressional Midterm Elections, by Party

Percent of registered voters who say they would vote for ___ if the 2026 congressional election were held today:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

voting, 54% support the Democrat, 37% support the Republican, 2% support other candidates, and 7% were unsure.

More than three-quarters of registered Republican voters who plan to vote are at least a little excited about voting (76%), including 31% who are very excited. Registered Democratic voters who plan to vote are more likely to be excited about voting, with 82% at least a little excited, and nearly half very excited (46%). Independents are the least likely to say they are excited about voting (63%), including 25% who are very excited.

Among registered voters who plan on voting by religious groups, Black Protestants (43%) are the most likely to say they are very excited about voting in the midterms. Around four in ten Jewish Americans (39%) and unaffiliated Americans (37%) also report being very excited, as do about one-third of Hispanic Catholics (35%), other non-Christians (33%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (32%), white evangelical Protestants (31%), and white Catholics (31%). Hispanic Protestants (26%) are the least likely to be very excited about voting.

The Weakening Trump Coalition?

In the 2024 presidential election, Trump made notable gains among groups that have historically backed Democrats. According to Pew Research Center's validated voter study, Trump gained 7 percentage points among both men under 30 (from 39% in 2020 to 46%) and Black voters (from 8% to 15%). Most striking was his gain among Hispanic voters, whose support jumped 12 points, from 36% to 48%. These shifts led some observers to predict that Republicans were poised for continued gains among younger and non-white voters.

But there are signs those gains were not part of a long-term partisan realignment. Heading into the midterms, Black and Hispanic voters appear far more inclined to back Democrats. Among registered voters who plan to vote, Black voters favor the Democratic candidate by a wide margin (69% vs. 8%), as do Hispanic voters (48% vs. 26%) and AAPI voters (59% vs. 22%). White voters, by contrast, lean toward the Republican candidate (44% vs. 36%). White voters without a college degree are more likely to favor the Republican candidate (49% vs. 27%), while white voters with a college degree are more likely to favor the Democratic candidate (47% vs. 37%).

FIGURE 22. The 2026 Congressional Midterm Elections, by Race

Percent of registered voters who say they would vote for ___ if the 2026 congressional election were held today:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Women who plan to vote are more likely to say they would vote for the Democratic candidate (45%) over the Republican candidate (32%), while men are equally likely to say they would vote for the Democratic or the Republican candidate (41% vs. 40%). Across age groups, Americans ages 18-29 (47% vs. 29%) and 30-49 (44% vs. 29%) who plan to vote are more likely to say they would vote for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate, while Americans ages 50-64 (38% vs. 41%) and 65 and older (44% vs. 41%) are more evenly divided.

Gender differences are particularly pronounced among younger voters. A majority of women ages 18-29 (53%) say they would vote for the Democratic candidate, compared with 26% who would vote for the Republican candidate, while men in this age group are more closely divided (42% Democratic vs. 32% Republican). Notably, however, young men remain 10 points more likely to back Democratic candidates. Among voters ages 50-64 and those ages 65 and older, men are more likely to support the Republican candidate (both 47%), while women across all age groups are more likely to support the Democratic candidate.

FIGURE 23. The 2026 Congressional Midterm Elections, by Age and Gender

Percent of registered voters who say they would vote for ___ if the 2026 congressional election were held today:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

There has been a persistent mythology that a "God gap" is apparent in voting patterns: The more frequently one attends church, the more likely one is to vote Republican. However, this linear positive relationship only holds true for white voters. White registered voters who attend weekly or more (61% vs. 19%) or attend monthly (51% vs. 31%) are more likely to vote for the Republican candidate than the Democratic candidate, while white registered voters who attend seldom or never are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate (48% vs. 32%).

By contrast, Hispanic registered voters who attend church monthly (45% vs. 25%) or seldom or never (56% vs. 18%) are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate, while those who attend weekly are equally likely to vote for either candidate. Black registered voters, regardless of church attendance, are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate.

FIGURE 24. The Whites-Only "God Gap": 2026 Congressional Midterm Elections, by Race and Religious Attendance

Percent of registered voters who would vote for ___ if the 2026 congressional election were held today:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Among those who are registered to vote and plan to vote, white evangelical Protestants (68%) and white Catholics (51%) are the only religious groups with majorities who would vote for the Republican candidate. Pluralities of Hispanic Protestants (44% Republican vs. 35% Democrat) and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestant voters (43% Republican vs. 35% Democrat) are more likely to say they would vote for the Republican candidate than the Democratic candidate. By contrast, strong majorities of Black Protestants (76%), the religiously unaffiliated (63%), other non-Christians (56%), Jewish Americans (52%), and Hispanic Catholics (48%) say they would vote for the Democratic candidate over the Republican candidate.

FIGURE 25. The 2026 Congressional Midterm Elections, by Religion

Percent of registered voters who say they would vote for ___ if the 2026 congressional election were held today:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Regret About 2024 Presidential Vote Choice

We asked Americans who they voted for in the 2024 presidential election and whether they were satisfied or regretted their vote choice. Among Trump voters, 13% say they regret their vote, compared with 3% who voted for former Vice President Kamala Harris. Among those who did not vote, 24% said they regret their decision.

Among Trump voters, 23% of independents say they regret their vote, compared with just 8% of Republicans. By contrast, among Harris voters, just 5% of independents and 1% of Democrats say they regret their vote.

Across racial groups, Trump voters are significantly more likely than Harris voters to regret their vote. This gap is wider among Hispanic voters, with 22% of Trump voters regretting their vote, compared with 4% of Harris voters. Among white voters, 11% of Trump voters regret their vote, compared with 3% of Harris voters. Among Black voters, who mostly voted for Harris, just 3% regret their vote.

FIGURE 26. Regret About 2024 Presidential Vote Choice, by Party and Race

Percent of Trump and Harris voters who regret their vote:



Note: *Insufficient sample size.

Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

White Christian voters, who mostly voted for Trump, are also more likely to regret their vote if they voted for Trump than if they voted for Harris (10% vs. 4%). This is evident among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (12% vs. 4%) and white Catholics (7% vs. 3%). Among white evangelical Protestants, 10% of Trump voters and 6% of Harris voters regret their vote. By contrast, among Christians of color and non-Christians, who mostly voted for Harris, relatively smaller shares of Harris voters regret their vote, including religiously unaffiliated Americans (2%), Black Protestants (2%), Hispanic Catholics (3%), and members of non-Christian religions (6%).[5] Notably, among religiously unaffiliated Americans who voted for Trump, 23% regret their vote.

Across age groups, Trump voters are more likely than Harris voters to regret their vote, but younger Trump voters are considerably more likely than older Trump voters to regret their vote. One in five Trump voters ages 18-29 (20%) regrets their vote, as do 18% of those ages 30-49, compared with 11% of those ages 50-64 and 9% of those ages 65 and older. Men and women who voted for Trump are similarly likely to regret their vote (13% vs. 14%) as those who voted for Harris (both 3%).

5 The number of cases of Hispanic Protestant voters in the 2024 election is too small to examine whether they are satisfied or regret their vote.

Favorability for the Parties

The Republican Party

Around one-third of Americans (34%) hold favorable views of the Republican Party, while a majority (59%) view it unfavorably. Favorability for the Republican Party has declined since PRRI first asked this question in 2012 (44%). Most Republicans (80%) hold favorable views of their own party, compared with 28% of independents and 6% of Democrats. Since 2012, favorable views of the Republican Party have declined among independents (43% to 28%) and Democrats (11% to 6%), while Republicans' favorability has also dropped, from 86% to 80%.

White evangelical Protestants (64%, down from 71% in 2025) and Latter-day Saints (59%) are the most likely to hold favorable views of the Republican Party, followed by about half of white Catholics (51%), and 45% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (down from 55% in 2025). Around one-third of Hispanic Protestants (34%) now hold favorable views, down from 49% in 2025, followed by one in four Jewish Americans (26%), other non-Christians (24%) as well as around two in ten Hispanic Catholics (22%) and unaffiliated Americans (19%). Black Protestants (11%) are the least likely to hold favorable views of the Republican Party.

FIGURE 27. Favorability of the Republican Party, 2012 and 2026, by Party

Percent who hold very or somewhat favorable views of the Republican Party:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2012 and 2026.

Reasons Americans View the Republican Party Unfavorably

PRRI asked Americans to select all the reasons they hold an unfavorable view of the Republican Party. Of the 59% who hold unfavorable views, two-thirds say it is because the party does not represent the interests and values of people like them (66%). About six in ten say it is because the party is too deferential to Trump (55%) and 48% say it is extreme and too right-wing (down from 55% in 2025). Three in ten say the Republican party is too closely aligned with religious groups (30%), and just 6% say it is because the party is not conservative enough.

Only 18% of Republicans view their own party unfavorably. Over four in ten of these Republicans say it is either because the party is too deferential to Trump (44%) or it does not represent the interests and values of people like them (43%). Three in ten say it is because the party is extreme and too right-wing (31%). Less than two in ten say the party is too closely tied to religious groups (14%) or is not conservative enough (11%).

Of the 68% of independents who hold an unfavorable view of the Republican Party, most say it is because the party does not represent the interests and values of people like them (62%, slightly down from 65% in 2025), is too deferential to Trump (55%, down from 59% in 2025), or is extreme and too right-wing (47%, down from 56% in 2025). Three in ten say it is too closely tied to religious groups (27%), and 6% say the party is not conservative enough.

FIGURE 28. Reasons for Unfavorable Views of the Republican Party, by Party

Percent who say ___ is a reason they hold unfavorable views of Republican Party:



Note: Multiple responses accepted.

Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

The Democratic Party

Over one-third of Americans view the Democratic Party favorably (36%), compared with around six in ten who view it unfavorably (57%). Favorable views of the Democratic Party have declined since 2012, when a slim majority (51%) viewed it favorably. Democrats' favorability toward their own party has also dropped sharply, from 93% in 2012 to 77% today. Favorable views among independents have declined as well, from 46% in 2012 to 33% in 2026. Republicans have held consistently low views of the Democratic Party (10% to 7%).

FIGURE 29. Favorability of the Democratic Party, 2012 and 2026, by Party

Percent who hold very or somewhat favorable views of the Democratic Party:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2012 and 2026.

Two-thirds of Black Protestants (66%, up from 52% in 2025) and half of Hispanic Catholics (49%) hold favorable views of the Democratic Party, as do about four in ten members of other non-Christian religions (45%), Jewish Americans (43%), and unaffiliated Americans (42%). Around three in ten Hispanic Protestants (33%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (32%, up from 26% in 2025), white Catholics (27%), and Latter-day Saints (26%) also hold favorable views. Only 15% of white evangelical Protestants view the Democratic Party favorably.

Reasons Americans View the Democratic Party Unfavorably

Of the six in ten Americans (57%, slightly down from 60% in 2025) who view the Democratic Party unfavorably, the majority say it is because the party does not represent the interests and values of people like them (59%, down from 65% in 2025) or because the party is extreme and too left-wing (53%). Around two in ten say it is because the Democratic Party is anti-religious (22%) or not fighting hard enough against Trump (19%), and 13% say the party is not progressive enough.

Of the 21% of Democrats who hold unfavorable views of their own party, nearly six in ten say it is because the party is not fighting hard enough against Trump (59%). Over one-third say the party

does not represent the interests and values of people like them (36%) or it is not progressive enough (35%). Two in ten believe the party is extreme and too-left wing (19%), and only 7% hold unfavorable views because the party is anti-religious.

Of the 62% of independents who view the Democratic Party unfavorably, a slim majority say it is because the party does not represent the interest and values of people like them (52%, down from 60% in 2026). Nearly half of independents say the Democratic Party is extreme and too left-wing (49%), 23% say it is not fighting hard enough against Trump (down from 28% in 2025), 13% say it is not progressive enough (down from 18% in 2025), and 17% say it is anti-religious.

FIGURE 30. Reasons for Unfavorable Views of the Democratic Party, by Party

Percent who say ___ is a reason they hold unfavorable views of Democratic Party:



Note: Multiple responses accepted.

Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Election Integrity and Political Violence

Election Integrity and Interference

The 2020 Election Was Stolen from Trump

Nearly one-third of Americans (27%, down from 31% in 2024) agree with the statement that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, while two-thirds disagree (67%). About six in ten Republicans (59%, down from 62% in 2024), compared with 20% of independents (down from 27% in 2024) and just 9% of Democrats (up from 4%), believe the 2020 election was stolen from Trump. Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are more than twice as likely as those who hold unfavorable views to agree (69% vs. 28%). However, agreement among Republicans who hold unfavorable views of Trump has increased significantly, from 9% in 2024 to 28% today.

Americans who most trust far-right news outlets (71%) and Fox News (65%) are the most likely to agree with the statement that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, compared with half of those who most trust radio (50%), over one-third of those who most trust social media (37%) and those who most trust YouTube or podcasts (36%), just 16% of those who most trust mainstream media, and 12% of those who most trust newspapers.

FIGURE 31. Views the 2020 Election Was Stolen from Trump, by Party and Favorable Views of Trump

Percent who agree the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump:



Source: PRRI American Values Surveys, 2024 and 2026.

White evangelical Protestants (50%, down from 56% in 2024) and Latter-day Saints (49%) are the only religious groups in which half agree that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump. Significantly smaller minorities of all other religious groups agree with this sentiment. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) agree that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, compared with 46% of Sympathizers, 23% of Skeptics, and 7% of Rejecters.

Support for Presidential Intervention in Local Vote Counting

Six in ten Americans (59%) disagree with the statement "If there are serious concerns about voter fraud in a local voting location, the president should order federal agents to seize the ballots and take over the vote counting," compared with 35% who agree. Majorities of Republicans (58%) agree, compared with 31% of independents and just 18% of Democrats. Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are more likely than those who hold unfavorable views to agree (65% vs. 37%).

White evangelical Protestants (50% agree; 46% disagree) and Hispanic Protestants (47% agree; 51% disagree) are divided on this question. Majorities of all other religious groups disagree that the president should interfere in local vote counting in response to fraud allegations, including 52% of Hispanic Catholics, 57% of both white Catholics and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, 59% of Latter-day Saints, and 63% of other non-Christians. Black Protestants (74%), unaffiliated Americans (73%), and Jewish Americans (71%) are the most likely to disagree.

FIGURE 32. Presidential Election Intervention in Response to Voter Fraud Allegations, by Party
Percent who agree with the following presidential election intervention if voter fraud is suspected:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Most Christian nationalism Adherents (65%) and Skeptics (52%) agree the president should interfere in local vote counting in response to fraud allegations, compared with 34% of Sympathizers and 15% of Adherents.

Support for Trump Possibly Postponing the 2026 Midterm Elections

Seven in ten Americans (70%) disagree with the statement "If states can't get voter fraud under control, the president should postpone the 2026 midterm elections for Congress," compared with 24% who agree. Republicans (34%, down from 40% in 2025) are more likely than independents (20%), and Democrats (16%) to support a potential postponement of the 2026 midterms. Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are more likely than those who hold unfavorable views to agree (37% vs. 26%).

Few religious Americans support a potential postponement of the 2026 midterm elections. Hispanic Protestants (36%) and Hispanic Catholics (31%) are the most likely to agree that the elections should be postponed, followed by white evangelical Protestants (28%), members of other non-Christian religions (27%) and Latter-day Saints (25%). About one-quarter or fewer of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (23%), white Catholics (21%), Black Protestants (20%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (17%), and Jewish Americans (16%) agree.

Nearly half of Christian nationalism Adherents (48%) agree with postponing the 2026 midterm elections if voter fraud is not under control, compared with 32% of Sympathizers, 23% of Skeptics, and 9% of Rejecters.

Racial Discrimination in U.S. Elections and Voting

Nearly six in ten Americans (58%) agree with the statement "Racial discrimination remains a serious problem in U.S. elections and voting today," compared with 37% who disagree. Majorities of Democrats (86%) and independents (59%) agree, compared with just 29% of Republicans. Most Republicans (68%) disagree with this statement.

White Christian groups are the least likely to agree that racial discrimination remains a serious problem in U.S. elections and voting today, including 47% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, 45% of white Catholics, 43% of Latter-day Saints, and 34% of white evangelical Protestants. By contrast, solid majorities of non-Christians and Christians of color agree, including Black Protestants (85%), non-Christians (76%), unaffiliated (73%), Hispanic Catholics (71%), Hispanic Protestants (65%), and Jewish Americans (65%).

Most Christian nationalism Rejecters (86%) and Skeptics (60%) agree that racial discrimination remains a serious problem in U.S. elections and voting today, compared with 43% of Sympathizers and 40% of Adherents.

The Biggest Problem in U.S. Elections

In 2026, 46% of Americans say they agree with the statement "The biggest problem in U.S. elections today is people casting votes who are not eligible to vote," while 50% agree with the statement "The biggest problem in U.S. elections today is eligible voters being denied the right to vote."[6] The partisan divides on this question are stark. Approximately eight in ten Republicans (82%) agree with the first statement, while most Democrats (80%) agree with the second statement. Independents are more likely to agree that the biggest problem in U.S. elections today is eligible voters being denied the right to vote (52%) than people casting votes who are not eligible to vote (43%).

Majorities of white Christian groups agree that the biggest problem is people casting votes who are not eligible to vote, including 74% of white evangelical Protestants and 58% of white non-evangelical/Protestants, white Catholics, and Latter-day Saints. By contrast, most Christians of color and non-Christians agree with the statement that the biggest problem is eligible voters being denied the right to vote, including 79% of Black Protestants, 64% of both unaffiliated and other non-Christians, 59% of Jewish Americans, and 58% of Hispanic Catholics. Hispanic Protestants are divided (51% vs. 47%).

FIGURE 33. Views on the Biggest Problem in U.S. Elections, by Party

Percent who agree the biggest problem in U.S. elections today is:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

6 In previous years, respondents were asked to choose which of two issues they considered the bigger problem in U.S. elections: "people casting votes who are not eligible to vote" or "eligible voters being denied the right to vote."

Reforms for Members of Congress and Supreme Court Justices

Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices

Three-quarters of Americans (74%) agree there should be term limits for U.S. Supreme Court justices, including 88% of Democrats, 74% of independents, and 66% of Republicans.

Elected Officials Using Their Power to Financially Benefit Themselves or Their Family

Less than one in ten Americans (7%) believe it should be legal for elected officials to use their public office to financially benefit themselves or members of their family, while the vast majority of Americans (88%) believe this should be illegal in all or most cases, including over seven in ten who say it should be illegal in all cases (71%). Opposition is bipartisan, with over nine in ten Democrats (92%), Republicans (91%), and independents (91%) believing politicians should not be allowed to use their political power to financially benefit themselves or their family.

Elected Officials Drawing Voting Maps for Party Advantage

Few Americans support elected officials drawing voting maps to give their own political party an advantage, with only one in ten Americans (12%) believing it should be legal in all or most cases; over eight in ten Americans (83%) say it should be illegal, including nearly six in ten believing it should be illegal in all cases (58%). Though there is strong bipartisan agreement on this issue, Republicans (81%) are less likely to oppose partisan gerrymandering than Democrats (87%) and independents (86%).

Elected Officials Buying or Selling Stocks While in Office

Only 15% of Americans say it should be legal for elected officials to buy or sell individual stocks while in office, while eight in ten Americans (80%) say it should be illegal, including 54% who believe it should be illegal in all cases. Majorities of each partisan group say this practice should be illegal, though Republicans (79%) are statistically less likely than Democrats (84%) and independents (83%) to agree.

FIGURE 34. Reform For Elected Officials, by Party

Percent who believe elected officials ___ should be illegal in all or most cases:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Values: Empathy, Belonging, and Trust

Empathy as a Benefit or Threat to Society

Nearly seven in ten Americans (68%) believe empathy is a "foundational moral value that helps build a healthy society," compared with less than three in ten who believe empathy "can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided by God's truth" (27%). The vast majority of Democrats (84%) agree empathy helps build a healthy society, while seven in ten independents (70%) and a slim majority of Republicans (54%) agree.[7] Republicans who hold a favorable view of Trump are split in their views on empathy. Republicans who hold a favorable view of Trump are split in their views on empathy. About half side with the statement that empathy is a foundational moral value (49%), and nearly as many believe empathy can be dangerous (48%). By contrast, nearly three-quarters of Republicans who view Trump unfavorably (72%) view empathy as a foundational moral value.

FIGURE 35. Views on Empathy, by Party

Percent who agree:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

7 This question was asked for the first time in September 2025, with slightly different wording, as follows: the statements were worded as: "Statement 1: Empathy is a moral value that is the foundation of a healthy society. OR Statement 2: Empathy is a dangerous emotion that undermines our ability to set up society that is guided by God's truth." At that time, solid majorities of Americans agreed with the first statement (80%), including 90% of Democrats, 83% of independents, and 72% of Republicans.

With the exception of white evangelical Protestants (42%), around two-thirds or more of all major religious groups believe that empathy is a foundational moral value for a healthy society, including about eight in ten religiously unaffiliated Americans (83%), members of other non-Christian religions (80%), and Jewish Americans (77%). By contrast, a majority of white evangelical Protestants (54%) believe empathy can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided by God's truth.

FIGURE 36. Views on Empathy, by Religion

Percent who agree:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

The survey also finds that skepticism about the social value of empathy is strong among Christian nationalism Adherents. Six in ten Adherents (59%) believe empathy can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided on God's truth, with half strongly agreeing with the statement (50%). By contrast, nearly all Christian nationalism Rejecters (94%) say empathy is a foundational moral value for a healthy society, compared with 76% of Skeptics, 52% of Sympathizers, and 38% of Adherents.

FIGURE 37. Views on Empathy, by Christian Nationalism Groups

Percent who agree:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Moving to a Different Country that Aligns With My Values

Three in ten Americans (30%) say that over the last two years, they have seriously thought about moving to a different country that would be more aligned with their values, while two-thirds have not considered this (66%). More than four in ten Democrats (43%) have considered moving to a different country in the last two years, compared with 32% of independents and only 14% of Republicans.

Around four in ten religiously unaffiliated Americans (42%) and members other non-Christian religions (39%) have considered moving to a different country that is more aligned with their values. About one-third of non-white Christian groups have also considered this, followed by one-quarter of most white Christian groups and Jewish Americans. Only 14% of white evangelical Protestants have thought about moving to a different country that would more align with their values.

Nearly half of Christian nationalism Rejecters (46%) agree that over the last two years, they have seriously thought about moving to a different country that would be more aligned with their values, compared with 29% of Skeptics, 23% of Sympathizers, and 21% of Adherents.

White Americans are less likely than Black, AAPI, and Hispanic Americans to say they have considered moving to a different country. Older Americans are also less likely than younger Americans to say they have thought about moving to a different country that better aligns with their values.

Trust in Different Groups

Overall, majorities of Americans trust varying groups of people that are within their communities. Around three-quarters of Americans somewhat or completely trust people in their neighborhood (77%), those of another religion (74%), and those born outside of the United States (72%). Six in ten trust people who support another political party (61%) but less than half say they trust people they meet for the first time (48% trust vs. 46% do not trust).

Republicans are more likely to trust people in their neighborhood than Democrats and independents (84% vs. 80% and 75%, respectively) but are less likely to trust those of another religion (73% vs. 81% and 76%) or those born outside the U.S. (66% vs. 82% and 73%). Republicans are nearly twice as likely as Democrats and 10 percentage points more likely as independents to not trust people who were born outside the U.S. (30% vs. 16% and 21%). Democrats are less likely to trust those of another political party (56% vs. 66% of independents and 64% of Republicans), while independents are less likely to trust people they meet for the first time (47% vs. 54% of Democrats and 52% of Republicans).

FIGURE 38. Trust in Different Groups, by Party

Percent who completely or somewhat trust:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Trust is positively correlated with age groups, with the youngest Americans showing the least amount of trust for each group and the oldest with the most. Across partisan groups, Americans over age 50 are more likely than those under 50 to trust people who support another political party. The largest age gap is among Democrats: 65% of those age 50 or older trust people who support another political party, compared with 49% of those under age 50. Smaller age gaps appear among independents (74% vs. 61%) and Republicans (66% vs. 60%).

FIGURE 39. Trust in Different Groups, by Age

Percent who completely or somewhat trust:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Perceptions of Immigrants and Immigration Policy

Perceptions of Immigrants

Around one-third of Americans agree with the so-called "great replacement theory," or the belief that "immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background" (35%), while 61% disagree. Views have held steady since the question was first asked in 2019, with Republicans (66%) significantly more likely than either independents (30%) or Democrats (14%) to agree with this statement.

FIGURE 40. Views on Great Replacement Theory, by Party

Percent who agree that "Immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background":



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

White evangelical Protestants (61%) are the only religious group where the majority agree that immigrants are invading the country. Less than half of white Catholics (47%) and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (44%) agree with the "great replacement theory," as well as less than four in ten Latter-day Saints (39%), around three in ten Jewish Americans (34%), Hispanic Protestants (29%), and members of other non-Christian religions (28%), less than one-quarter of Black Protestants (23%) and religiously unaffiliated Americans (23%), and only 16% of Hispanic Catholics.

FIGURE 41. Views on Great Replacement Theory, by Religion

Percent who agree that "Immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background":



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Nearly seven in ten Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (69%) agree with the "great replacement theory," compared with 57% of Sympathizers, 32% of Skeptics, and just 9% of Rejecters.

Younger Americans are significantly less likely than older Americans to agree that immigrants are invading the country and replacing its cultural and ethnic background: 26% of those ages 18-29 and 30% of those ages 30-49 agree, compared with 41% of those ages 50-64 and 43% of those ages 65 and older.

Rights and Protections for Immigrants

Pathway to Citizenship

Approximately six in ten Americans (59%) say that immigrants living in the United States illegally should be given a way to become citizens, provided they meet certain requirements. More than one in ten say they would prefer undocumented immigrants to be eligible for permanent residency status but not citizenship (13%), and one in four say all immigrants living in the country illegally should be identified and deported (24%). These levels of support for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants has remained remarkably consistent since 2013, with a high of 67% in 2019 and a low of 56% in 2024.

Democrats (79%) have grown more supportive of a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, with support increasing from 71% in 2013 when the question was first asked. By contrast, Republicans have become consistently less supportive, from a high of 53% in 2013 to 37% today.

FIGURE 42. Support for a Pathway to Citizenship for Undocumented Immigrants, 2013-2026, by Party

Percent who say there should be a pathway for immigrants living in the country illegally to become citizens, provided they meet certain requirements:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2013-2026.

Notably, support among Republicans for identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants has steadily increased since 2013, from 32% to a high of 57% in 2024 before dropping to around half in 2025 (48%) and 2026 (50%). Independents (61%) have remained mostly consistent (64% in 2013). Notably, the partisan gap on this question has more than doubled over the last decade, from 18 percentage points in 2013 to 42 percentage points in 2026.

Around seven in ten Hispanic Catholics (77%), Black Protestants (73%), Hispanic Protestants (70%), and unaffiliated Americans (68%) support allowing undocumented immigrants to become citizens, followed by majorities of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (55%), members of other non-Christian religions (55%), white Catholics (54%), and Jewish Americans (54%); Latter-day Saints (50%) are divided. White evangelical Protestants (44%) are the only religious group without majority support. Support among white evangelical Protestants for identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants has trended upward over the past decade, from 30% in 2013, to a peak at 53% in 2024, and down to 47% in 2026.

Eight in ten Christian nationalism Rejecters (78%) and six in ten Skeptics (62%) support allowing undocumented immigrants to become citizens, compared with 48% of Christian nationalism Sympathizers and 39% of Adherents.

FIGURE 43. Views of White Evangelical Protestants on a Pathway to Citizenship for Undocumented Immigrants, 2013-2026

Percent of white evangelical Protestants who say undocumented immigrants should be:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2013-2026.

Allowing Children Brought to the U.S. Illegally to Become Citizens

Six in ten Americans (59%) favor allowing immigrants brought to United States as children to gain legal resident status, while 36% oppose. Support for this policy peaked in 2020 at 66% and was at its lowest in 2024 at 52% since the question was first asked in 2018. Eight in ten Democrats (80%) support this policy, compared with 62% of independents and less than four in ten Republicans (37%).

Solid majorities of Hispanic Catholics (83%), Jewish Americans (71%), unaffiliated Americans (71%), Black Protestants (70%), and Hispanic Protestants (69%) favor allowing children brought to the country illegally to gain resident status. Smaller majorities of members of other non-Christian religions (58%) and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (52%), as well as half of white Catholics (50%), also support this policy. Latter-day Saints (47%) and white evangelical Protestants (41%) do not reach majority support.

Most Christian nationalism Rejecters (82%) and Skeptics (64%) favor allowing immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally as children to gain legal resident status, compared with 48% of Sympathizers and 35% of Adherents.

FIGURE 44. Support for Allowing immigrants Brought Illegally to the U.S. as Children to Gain Legal Residence, 2018-2026, by Party

Percent who favor allowing immigrants brought illegally to the U.S. as children gain legal residence:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2018-2026.

Birthright Citizenship

Two-thirds of Americans (65%) favor the "U.S. Constitution's existing guarantee that all children who are born in the United States are automatically granted U.S. citizenship, regardless of their parents' citizenship status," while 30% oppose. Most Democrats (88%) and independents (68%) consistently favor birthright citizenship, compared with 40% of Republicans, who have declined significantly since the question was first asked in March 2025.[8]

Strong majorities of most religious groups support birthright citizenship, including 84% of Hispanic Catholics, 82% Black Protestants, 76% of unaffiliated Americans, 75% of Jewish Americans, 74% of Hispanic Protestants, 71% of members of other non-Christian religions, 62% of Latter-day Saints, 60% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, and 55% of white Catholics. Less than half of white evangelical Protestants (45%) also support birthright citizenship, down from 49% since the question was first asked in March 2025.

FIGURE 45. Support for Birthright Citizenship, 2025 and 2026, by Party

Percent who favor the U.S. Constitution's existing guarantee that all children who are born in the United States are automatically granted U.S. citizenship, regardless of their parents' citizenship status:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2025 and 2026.

8 At the end of 2018, PRRI asked a variation of this question, measuring the extent to which Americans favored "changing the Constitution to prevent children who are born in the United States to non-U.S. citizens from automatically being granted American citizenship." At the time, a majority of Americans (52%) opposed this proposal, while two-thirds of Republicans (67%) favored it, compared with 40% of independents and 25% of Democrats.

Nine in ten Christian nationalism Rejecters (89%) support birthright citizenship, compared with 70% of Skeptics, 57% of Sympathizers, and 41% of Adherents.

Younger Americans are significantly more likely than older Americans to favor preserving the Constitution's guarantee of birthright citizenship: Seven in ten each among those ages 18-29 (71%) and 30-49 (70%) favor this, compared with 59% of those ages 50-64 and 60% of those ages 65 and older.

Immigration and Law Enforcement

Internment Camps for Undocumented Immigrants

More than six in ten Americans (62%) disagree that the federal government should detain immigrants who are in the country illegally in internment camps until they can be deported, while one-third agree (33%). Republicans (62%) are far more likely to agree with this policy, compared with either independents (28%) or Democrats (16%), and Republicans have seen the most significant shifts in their views. In September 2025, 69% of Republicans agreed with the policy. However, by February 2026, support increased to 73%, before declining to 62% today. Independents and Democrats have seen little change in this timeframe.

White evangelical Protestants (53%) are the only religious group where the majority agree with placing undocumented immigrants into internment camps until they can be deported. Around

FIGURE 46. Support for Internment Camps for Undocumented Immigrants, 2025 and 2026, by Party

Percent who agree that the federal government should detain immigrants who are in the country illegally in internment camps until they can be deported:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2025 and 2026.

four in ten white Catholics (45%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (41%), and Latter-day Saints (39%) agree with this policy, followed by around one-third of members of other non-Christian religions (35%), one-quarter of Black Protestants (29%), Jewish Americans (27%), Hispanic Protestants (23%), and unaffiliated Americans (22%), and only 16% of Hispanic Catholics.

Most Christian nationalism Adherents (62%) and Sympathizers (51%) agree that undocumented immigrants should be placed in internment camps, compared with 32% of Skeptics and only 11% of Rejecters.

Stripping Citizenship and Deporting If Deemed a Threat to the Country

Most Americans (54%) oppose stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country, while 41% favor this policy. Nearly six in ten Republicans (57%) favor this policy, compared with fewer than four in ten independents (37%) and Democrats (31%).

FIGURE 47. Immigration and Law Enforcement, by Religion
Percent who agree with:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Approximately half of white Christian groups favor stripping citizenship and deporting those deemed a threat to the country, compared with far fewer other religious groups or the religiously unaffiliated.

About two-thirds of Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (65%) and 54% of Sympathizers favor this policy, compared with 42% of Skeptics and 23% of Rejecters.

Gender and Women's Rights

Repealing Women's Right to Vote

Nearly nine in ten Americans (87%) disagree with repealing the 19th Amendment of the Constitution, which established the right for women to vote, while less than one in ten Americans (8%) agree. Across partisanship, religion, Christian nationalism groups, and all other key demographics, there is overwhelming support for maintaining the 19th Amendment.

Society Has Become Too Soft and Feminine

Less than four in ten Americans (38%) agree that society as a whole has become too soft and feminine, while a majority (57%) disagree. Though there has been little shift in agreement among all Americans since the question was first asked in 2011, the partisan divide has widened significantly, from 23 points in 2011 to 48 points today. Around two-thirds of Republicans (65%) now agree society has become too soft and feminine, up from 53% in 2011; only 17% of Democrats agree, down from 30% in 2011. Independents have remained consistent over time (37% in 2011 vs. 39% today).

Men are 13 percentage points more likely than women to believe society has become too soft and feminine (45% vs. 32%).

FIGURE 48. Society Has Become Too Soft and Feminine, 2011-2026, by Party
Percent who agree that society as a whole has become too soft and feminine:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2011-2026.

White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group where the majority (58%) agree that society has become too soft and feminine. Less than half of white Catholics (48%), around four in ten white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (43%), Hispanic Protestants (42%), and Latter-day Saints (39%), one-third of Hispanic Catholics (35%) and members of other non-Christian religions (33%), and less than three in ten unaffiliated Americans (29%), Jewish Americans (28%), and Black Protestants (27%) also agree.

Two-thirds of Christian nationalism Adherents (66%) and six in ten Sympathizers (59%) agree society is too soft and feminine, compared with 39% of Skeptics and just 14% of Rejecters.

Men and Women Should Stick with Jobs and Tasks Naturally Suited for Them

Four in ten Americans (39%) agree society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for, while a slim majority (55%) disagree; agreement has remained stable since the question was first asked in 2016. Partisan divide on this stance has more than doubled from 13 points in 2016 to 29 points today. The majority of Republicans (56%) agree men and women should stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for, up from 44% in 2016. Less than four in ten independents (38%) agree, down from 43% in 2016. Democrats have decreased slightly in agreement, from 31% in 2016 to 27% today.

FIGURE 49. Support for Traditional Gender Roles, 2016-2026, by Party

Percent who agree that society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for:



Source: PRRI Surveys, 2016-2026.

More than four in ten men (44%) agree men and women should stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for, compared with 35% of women.

Slim majorities of white evangelical Protestants (54%), Hispanic Protestants (54%) and Hispanic Catholics (51%) believe society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for. This is followed by about four in ten Latter-day Saints (44%), white Catholics (42%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (38%), Black Protestants (38%), and members of other non-Christian religions (37%), as well as three in ten Jewish Americans (30%) and unaffiliated Americans (27%).

Seven in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (69%) and six in ten Sympathizers (58%) agree men and women should stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited with, compared with 39% of Skeptics and only 16% of Rejecters.

Agreement that society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for increases by age: 34% of Americans ages 18-29 agree, compared with 39% of those ages 30-49, 40% of those ages 50-64, and 43% of those ages 65 and older. However, young men ages 18-29 (43%) are significantly more likely than young women ages 18-29 (25%) to agree that society is better off when men and women stick to naturally suited jobs and tasks. Notably, this 18-point gap is roughly double the 8-to-9-point gap seen in every older age group.

Foreign Policy

United States as a Reliable Neighbor or Mighty Nation

Less than two-thirds of Americans (64%) agree with the statement "I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a reliable neighbor that only uses military force as a last resort," while around one-third agree with the statement "I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use military force to defend its interests" (32%). Most Democrats (85%) and independents (69%) agree with the first statement, while nearly six in ten Republicans (57%) agree with the second statement.[9]

FIGURE 50. America in the World: Reliable Neighbor vs. Mighty Nation, by Party

Percent who agree "I would prefer the U.S. to be known as____":



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

9 This question was asked for the first time in May 2026, with slightly different wording, as follows: Statement 1: I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use military force to defend our interests; OR Statement 2: I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a reliable neighbor that cooperates with other nations and only uses military force as a last resort.

Except for white evangelical Protestants, who are evenly divided (49% vs. 48%), majorities across all religious groups prefer the reliable neighbor over mighty nation framing.

Nearly nine in ten Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters (88%) and seven in ten Skeptics (69%) would prefer the U.S. to be a reliable neighbor, compared with a slim majority of Sympathizers (53%) and about four in ten Adherents (41%). The majority of Christian nationalism Adherents (58%) would prefer the U.S. to be a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use military force to protect its interests.

FIGURE 51. America in the World: Reliable Neighbor vs. Mighty Nation, by Religion

Percent who agree "I would prefer the U.S. to be known as____":



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Trump's Foreign Policy Has Damaged Relationships with European Allies

A majority of Americans (63%) agree that Trump's foreign policy has seriously damaged the United States' relationships with its traditional European allies, while 29% disagree. Nearly nine in ten Democrats (88%) and seven in ten independents (70%) agree, compared with around one-third of Republicans (35%).

White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group where less than half believe Trump's foreign policy has damaged U.S. relationships with European allies (41%). About three-quarters of members of other non-Christian religions (77%), Black Protestants (77%), unaffiliated Americans (76%), and Hispanic Catholics (76%) agree, as well as six in ten Jewish Americans (63%), Hispanic Protestants (63%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (61%), and white Catholics (60%), and a slim majority of Latter-day Saints (53%).

Over nine in ten Christian nationalism Rejecters (92%) and seven in ten Skeptics (70%) agree Trump's foreign policy has seriously damaged the United States' relationships with European allies, compared with about half of Sympathizers (51%) and one-third of Adherents (34%).

Reducing Commitments With NATO Unless European Allies Spend More on Themselves

Most Americans (54%) agree the United States should reduce its military commitments to NATO unless European allies spend more on their own defense, while four in ten disagree (40%). Three-quarters of Republicans (77%) and a slim majority of independents (55%) agree with reduced commitments to NATO, compared with one-third of Democrats (34%).

Two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants (68%) agree the U.S. should reduce its military commitments to NATO unless European allies spend more for their own defenses, as do six in ten members of other non-Christian religions (61%), Hispanic Protestants (60%), Latter-day Saints (60%), and white Catholics (58%), and slim majorities of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (55%) and Hispanic Catholics (53%). Less than half of Black Protestants (48%) and unaffiliated Americans (46%), as well as 41% of Jewish Americans, also agree.

The U.S. Was Justified in Strikes Against Iran

Nearly six in ten Americans (57%) disagree that the United States was justified in carrying out military strikes against Iran, while more than one-third agree the U.S. was justified (36%). Republicans (71%) are more than twice as likely as independents (32%) and five times as likely as Democrats (14%) to believe the U.S. was justified in its strikes against Iran.

A solid majority of white evangelical Protestants (62%) and a slim majority of Latter-day Saints (54%) agree the U.S. was justified in its strikes against Iran, followed by less than half of white Catholics (49%), Jewish Americans (46%), and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (46%). About one-third of Hispanic Protestants (36%) and 23% each of members of other non-Christian religions, Black Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, and unaffiliated Americans also agree.

Over four in ten older Americans (42% of those ages 50-64 and 43% of those ages 65 and older) say the U.S. was justified, compared with one-third of those ages 30-49 (33%) and one-quarter of those ages 18-29 (26%).

FIGURE 52. U.S. Was Justified in Strikes Against Iran, by Party

Percent who agree the United States was justified in carrying out military strikes against Iran:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

The U.S. Provides Too Much Support to Israel

Nearly two-thirds of Americans (64%) agree the United States provides too much financial and military support to Israel, compared with three in ten who disagree (30%). Majorities of Democrats (77%) and independents (68%) agree, while Republicans are split on the issue (50% agree vs. 46% disagree).

With the exception of white evangelical Protestants (43%) and Jewish Americans (34%), solid majorities of each religious group agree the U.S. provides too much support to Israel.

FIGURE 53. Views on U.S. Support to Israel, by Party

Percent who agree the United States provides too much financial and military support to Israel:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

FIGURE 54. Views on U.S. Support to Israel, by Religion

Percent who agree the United States provides too much financial and military support to Israel:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Perceptions of the Conflict Between Israel and the Palestinians

When asked about the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, most Americans say either that their sympathies do not lie with either Israel or the Palestinians (38%) or lie with both groups (16%). Americans have slightly higher sympathies for Israel than the Palestinians (22% vs. 19%). Sympathies for Israel have decreased from 28% in 2024, while sympathies for the Palestinians have increased slightly from 15%.

Republicans (48%) are more likely than independents (18%) and Democrats (8%) to say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis, while Democrats (33%) are more likely than independents (20%) and Republicans (5%) to say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians; both Democrats (20%) and independents (18%) are more likely than Republicans (10%) to say their sympathies lie with both the Israelis and the Palestinians.

FIGURE 55. Perceptions of the Conflict Between Israel and the Palestinians, 2024 and 2026, by Party

Percent who say their sympathies lie more with:



Source: PRRI American Values Surveys, 2024 and 2026.

Jewish Americans (52%) and white evangelical Protestants (50%) stand out in that half say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis. Other white Christian groups are also more likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis than with the Palestinians. By contrast, Christians of color, religiously unaffiliated Americans, and Americans who identify with a non-Christian or non-Jewish religion say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians.

Christian nationalism Adherents (47%) are more likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis than Sympathizers (34%), Skeptics (21%), and Rejecters (5%), while Rejecters (46%) are more likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians than Skeptics (14%), Sympathizers (7%), and Adherents (5%).

Sympathy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict divides sharply by age: Sympathies lie more with the Israelis for just 12% of Americans ages 18-29 and 15% of Americans ages 30-49, compared with 28% among ages 50-64, and 35% among ages 65 and older. Sympathy for the Palestinians runs in the opposite direction, falling from 27% among the youngest Americans to 14-16% among those 50 and older.

FIGURE 56. Perceptions of the Conflict Between Israel and the Palestinians, by Religion
Percent who say their sympathies lie more with:



Source: PRRI American Values Survey, Aug. 20-Sept. 7, 2026.

Taking Control of Foreign Territory to Advance and Strengthen the Country

Three-fourths of Americans (75%) disagree that the United States should take control of foreign territory, such as Greenland or Cuba, because doing so would advance American interests and strengthen American power, compared with just two in ten who agree (19%). Solid majorities of Democrats (88%), independents (79%), and Republicans (62%) are against the idea; one-third of Republicans (35%) agree. Majorities of all religious traditions, Christian nationalism groups, and other key demographics disagree with type of foreign policy, with the lowest opposition coming from Christian nationalism Adherents at 53%.

Survey Methodology

The survey was designed and conducted by PRRI. The survey was made possible through the generous support of **the Andrew Carnegie Foundation, with additional support from the Ford Foundation**, and the **Unitarian Universalist Veatch Program at Shelter Rock**. The survey was conducted among a representative sample of 5,200 adults (age 18 and up) living in all 50 states in the United States, who are part of Ipsos's KnowledgePanel and an additional 339 who were recruited by Ipsos using opt-in survey panels to increase the sample sizes in smaller states. Interviews were conducted online between August 20-September 7, 2026.

Respondents are recruited to the KnowledgePanel using an addressed-based sampling methodology from the Delivery Sequence File of the USPS – a database with full coverage of all delivery addresses in the U.S. As such, it covers all households regardless of their phone status, providing

TABLE A1. Demographic, Political, Religious, and Geographic Subgroup Sample Sizes

	General Public (unweighted)
Total Sample	5,539
Male	2,614
Female	2,925
Republican	1,694
Independent	1,597
Democrat	1,744
Other/Don't know	504
White, non-Hispanic	3,833
Black, non-Hispanic	592
Hispanic	672
AAPI	268
Multiracial	113
Other	61
18-29	610
30-49	1,655
50-64	1,495
65+	1,779

	General Public (unweighted)
Total Sample	5,539
White evangelical Protestant	847
White mainline/non-evangelical Protestant	833
Black Protestant	372
Hispanic Protestant	176
Other Protestant of color	123
White Catholic	843
Hispanic Catholic	303
Latter-day Saint	97
Other Christian	156
Jewish	125
Non-Christian religion	230
Religiously unaffiliated	1,342
Northeast	969
Midwest	1,229
South	2,068
West	1,273

a representative online sample. Unlike opt-in panels, households are not permitted to "self-select" into the panel; and are generally limited to how many surveys they can take within a given time period.

The initial sample drawn from the KnowledgePanel was adjusted using pre-stratification weights so that it approximates the adult U.S. population. Next, a probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling scheme was used to select a representative sample.

To reduce the effects of any non-response bias, a post-stratification adjustment was applied. The needed benchmarks were obtained from the latest 2025 March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS), except language proficiency, which is not available from CPS, and was obtained from the 2024 American Community Survey (ACS). Additionally, the 2024 vote choice benchmark was obtained from the Associated Press Tabulation of Certified Results. The post-stratification weight rebalanced the sample based on the following benchmarks: gender by age, race/ethnicity, education, income, language proficiency, Census region by metropolitan status, and 2024 presidential vote choice. Additionally, we included individual states (50 states plus D.C.) to account for the oversampling of some states.

The margin of error for the national survey is **+/- 1.6** percentage points at the 95% level of confidence, including the design effect for the survey of **1.48**. In addition to sampling error, surveys may also be subject to error or bias due to question wording, context, and order effects. Additional details about the KnowledgePanel can be found on the Ipsos website: https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/solution/knowledgepanel

About PRRI

PRRI

PRRI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to research at the intersection of religion, values, and public life.

Our mission is to help journalists, opinion leaders, scholars, clergy, and the general public better understand debates on public policy issues and the role of religion and values in American public life by conducting high quality public opinion surveys and qualitative research.

PRRI is a member of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), the American Political Science Association (APSA), and the American Academy of Religion (AAR), and follows the highest research standards of independence and academic excellence.

PRRI is also a supporting organization of the Transparency Initiative at AAPOR, an initiative to place the value of openness at the center of the public opinion research profession.

As a nonpartisan, independent research organization, PRRI does not take positions on, nor do we advocate for, particular policies. Research supported by our funders reflects PRRI's commitment to independent inquiry and academic rigor. Research findings and conclusions are never altered to accommodate other interests, including those of funders, other organizations, or government bodies and officials.

History

Since PRRI's founding in 2009, our research has become a standard source of trusted information among journalists, scholars, policy makers, clergy, and the general public. PRRI research has been cited in thousands of media stories and academic publications and plays a leading role in deepening public understanding of the changing religious landscape and its role in shaping American politics.

For a full list of recent projects, see our research page: www.prri.org/research. PRRI also maintains a lively online presence on Bluesky (@prri.org), Facebook (facebook.com/prripoll), Instagram (instagram.com/prripoll), and Threads (threads.net/@prripoll).

PRRI
1400 16th Street NW, Suite 525
Washington, DC 20036
www.prri.org